Armenia (Brussels Morning) On November 15, delegations from Turkey and Azerbaijan undertook a visit to the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (hereafter “TRNC“), an unrecognized, illegal entity established in Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus. The Turkish delegation comprised members of President Erdoğan’s “Justice and Development Party” (AKP), while the Azerbaijani delegation was represented by members of President Aliyev’s “New Azerbaijan Party” (YAP). This “diplomatic” exchange occurred under the hospitality of the ruling party in the “TRNC,” the “National Unity Party” (UBP), led by the Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar.
A consequential agreement was reached during the meeting, symbolising the augmentation of political ties among the three entities, encapsulated by the motto “three states, one nation” (see below). In addition, during the signing ceremony, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation underscored the imperative of garnering increased international recognition for the “TRNC.”
This accord echoes a historical continuum, as nearly a year ago, in December 2022, representatives from AKP and YAP initiated a visit to the occupied territories in Cyprus, engaging with members of the UBP. The central theme of this political endeavour was rooted in the “one nation, three states” narrative, a variation of the prevailing slogan “one nation, two states,” inspired by Heydar Aliyev, the father and predecessor of the current Azerbaijani President Ilham, denoting Turkish-Azerbaijani relations.
This recent agreement crystallizes the outcome of the ongoing collaboration between the ruling parties of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the “TRNC,” as agreed in last December’s visit. Azerbaijan, as Turkey’s closest ally and a fellow Turkic state, has unofficially maintained ties with the “TRNC” since its declaration of independence in 1991.
In the mid-1990s, the Azerbaijani Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan recognised the independence of the “TRNC,” yet the central government in Baku refrained from formal recognition. A pivotal moment unfolded in 2000 when a delegation from the Azerbaijani National Assembly (Milli Mejlis) visited the occupied territories in Northern Cyprus, prompting a reciprocal “diplomatic” mission from Turkish Cypriots to Baku.
In 2004, President Ilham Aliyev had stated that if Greek-Cypriots rejected the U.N.-proposed Annan Plan, Azerbaijan would recognize the independence of Northern Cyprus. Despite the Greek Cypriots’ “no” vote in the April 24, 2004, referendum, Aliyev backtracked, fearing potential recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh by Greece or Cyprus and potential strain on Azerbaijan’s relations with the European Union.
In 2005, commercial flights from Azerbaijan to Cyprus’ occupied territories commenced, accompanied by Azerbaijani investments. Azerbaijan began receiving visitors with Turkish Cypriot passports, and recognising degrees from Turkish Cypriot universities. That year, President Aliyev, in a meeting with then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, expressed Azerbaijan’s desire to contribute to ending the international isolation of the “TRNC.”
Despite Azerbaijan’s amicable relations with the “TRNC” and its alliance with Turkey, the recognition of the “TRNC” faced hesitancy. The primary impetus behind Azerbaijan’s reluctance lay in its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh (also known as Artsakh). This caution extended to unacknowledged political entities, including Kosovo, Abkhazia, but also Northern Cyprus, due to Azerbaijan’s concerns about international ramifications.
Recent shifts in Azerbaijan’s posture are discernible following its triumph in the 2020 war with Armenia. With Armenians defeated in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku claimed the Karabakh Issue resolved. Consequently, principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity ceased to be useful for the Azerbaijani regime. In this context, Baku began tolerating secessionist voices claiming the Azeri-populated regions of Iran, occupied territories of the Republic of Armenia, and started flirting with the idea of a gradual recognition of the “TRNC.”
In particular, in July 2021, a delegation from the Azerbaijani National Assembly revisited Cyprus’ occupied territories, meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leaders. A few months later, in January 2022, the Turkish Cypriot “Prime Minister” Faiz Sucuoğlu announced Azerbaijan’s expected recognition of the “TRNC.” In August of the same year, Azerbaijani President met with the Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar in Turkey, and in September, Tatar also met with the Azerbaijani Ambassador to Turkey.
Two months later, Azerbaijan supported the inclusion of the “TRNC” in the Organisation of Turkic States (hereafter OTS). The “TRNC” achieved unanimous approval as an observer in the OTS, supported by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, in addition to Turkey and Azerbaijan. It is noteworthy that Baku had previously supported the inclusion of the “TRNC” in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 2004 and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 2012.
Last July, it became known that discussions were underway for the opening of an Azerbaijani embassy in Cyprus’ occupied territories.
On September 7, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev hosted the crisis management ministers of the OTS member states in Baku for the Second Ministerial Meeting on Crisis Management. Notably, this year marked the inclusion of the Turkish Cypriot “minister,” participating for the first time.
Welcoming the Turkic ministers, President Aliyev emphasised:
“Today, a representative from Northern Cyprus is with us for the first time. I extend a special greeting to our Turkish brothers in Northern Cyprus. The minister is here as an observer, proudly displaying his flag. Indeed, the flag of Northern Cyprus must and will wave at our event. Azerbaijan has consistently stood by our brothers […]. It is gratifying that Northern Cyprus was accepted into the OTS as an observer at the last Summit […] This demonstrates our unity and determination. It shows that we are and always will be standing by each other on the path of justice.”
However, Azerbaijan won’t immediately proceed with the recognition of the “TRNC.” In any case, following the September 19 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh and the expulsion of the local Armenian population, the main obstacle to recognizing the “TRNC,” ergo the “Republic of Artsakh,” does not longer exist. Therefore, recognition is likely to come sooner or later. Other close allies and partners of Ankara, such as Pakistan, might follow suit.
As Azerbaijan continues its collaboration with the “TRNC,” and Erdoğan exerts diplomatic pressure on Aliyev, the trajectory of diplomatic recognition for the “TRNC” appears imminent. The geopolitical landscape indicates that, under favourable conditions, Azerbaijan is poised to extend recognition to the “TRNC,” thereby reinforcing Turkey’s efforts toward a “two-state solution” in Cyprus and facilitating the participation of the “TRNC” in international organisations such as the OTS.
This strategic alignment also holds implications for Azerbaijan’s regional aspirations, particularly in relation to Armenia; since the 2020 victory, the Azerbaijani regime is gradually investing in irredentist concepts, such as the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative, indirectly claiming large parts of the Armenian Republic. President Aliyev is replacing his father’s “territorial nationalism” with revisionism and irredentism, and supporting Erdoğan’s plans for Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean could help Baku receiving Ankara’s diplomatic and military assistance in the case of a new confrontation with Armenia.
These diplomatic manoeuvres are aligned with Turkey’s evolving foreign policy doctrine and the establishment of the so-called “Axis of Turkey,” a geopolitical concept emphasizing a robust presence in the Turkic world and other regions. International recognition of the “TRNC” becomes a crucial step in materializing Turkey’s envisioned Axis, with Azerbaijan playing a pivotal role as Turkey’s closest ally.
In conclusion, the diplomatic landscape suggests that Azerbaijan is poised to extend recognition to the “TRNC” in the near future. As Azerbaijan deepens its collaboration with the Turkish Cypritos, and Turkey exerts diplomatic pressure, the geopolitical dynamics unfold with implications for regional stability and Turkey’s strategic influence.
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