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“A CDU chancellor governing with the Greens will keep the balance between cooperation with NATO and security initiatives within the EU. For a left-wing coalition, in contrast, cooperation within NATO and with the US would look more controversial.”
Washington DC (Brussels Morning) The German Presidency was defined by the pandemic, which has been seen wanting on several fronts. In this scheme, the question of the Eastern Partnership lied in the periphery of the public agenda. If any foreign policy issues did claim the headlines that would be Brexit, with London and Brussels narrowly avoiding collision.
However, there is a long-term question of strategic significance for Germany. In a rare show of continuity between the Trump and incoming Biden Administration Washington has made clear that it will continue to sanction companies supporting the Nord Stream II project. The project is opposed by a number of member states east of Berlin – Poland, Slovakia – but also Sweden. The question at large also creates an implicit rift with East Partnership countries, not least Ukraine, which Nord Stream II is designed to bypass. Looking at the broader context of the relationship between Europe, Russia, and the Eastern Partnership during the German Presidency, we speak to former Georgia’s Ambassador to Germany, Elguja Khokrishvili.
Ambassador Tedo Japaridze (TJ). Looking ahead, what is the future of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in your view?
Ambassador Elguja Khokrishvili (EK). The geopolitical and security situation in the EaP region {Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine} remains volatile and further complicated by the social and economic context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Through 2020 there were significant developments as regards to the structure of the Eastern Partnership framework. In May 2020 the European Council reaffirmed a “united commitment to creating a common space of democracy, prosperity and stability” founded on the rule of law, good governance and a successful anti-corruption policy. The emphasis was on building up the “resilience” of the “overarching policy framework.” The EU will set new objectives during the next EU summit scheduled for March 2021.
These summits are fairly apolitical and bureaucratic and such policies can yield results only if EaP governments were capable partners and Russia did not have the means to undermine existing politics. There was window of opportunity during the parallel enlargement of NATO and the EU. But as the wars in Georgia and Ukraine have indicated, that window is now closed. Today, European engagement in the Eastern Partnership is contested by Russia.
Russia sees the EU as an intrusive force into its exclusive sphere of influence. We also see emerging “third powers,” such as China and Turkey, becoming prominent players in the EaP region. While the EU acknowledges the strategic importance of the eastern neighborhood it struggles to act, when national member state priorities diverse, vis-à-vis Russia, China or Turkey. The EU is currently missing the driving force that would be able to build a political consensus among member states around an EaP policy after 2020 that go beyond the implementation of the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Strategic policy goals for the associated countries are largely absent.
TJ. How is the COVID-19 pandemic affecting EU relations with the Eastern Partnership?
EK. The EU was a step behind its competitors – primarily Russia and China – when it comes to showing its support during Covid-19 pandemic. In 2020 the EU dispatched a timely emergency response to worth 1 billion EUR in the framework of the EU’s “Team Europe” package support. That support echoed {the Commissions’} intention for the EU to become an active geopolitical actor and the interest in ensuring stability in the eastern neighbourhood, bolstering partners’ resilience in the region by delivering tangible results for people.
At the latest European Council there was a decision to share vaccines from allocated contracts with the closest EU neighbours, such as the Western Balkan countries. And it is really to be welcomed that Foreign Ministers of 13 member-states called for an extension of similar vaccine-sharing support to the Eastern Partnership countries. That is a strong message on the significance of the region ahead of the EaP summit in March.
The covid-19 crisis may dominate the EU’s current priorities, but it has not caused other powers to pursue less assertively their geopolitical objectives. The EU’s global influence, as well as the health of the transatlantic alliance, will depend on whether it plays a bigger role in security developments in its neighbourhood. This will require the EU to strengthen its alliances and security partnerships with neighbouring countries and be less reluctant to change the behaviour of other powers.
From the point of view of the associated EaP partners, the EU must face up to security challenges that have been neglected so far. The security risks in the region must be countered strategically by reference to an “expanded security concept” that covers critical infrastructure (ports, waterways), especially in associated EaP countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), so that they can be integrated more deeply both economically and in terms of security. To achieve European strategic sovereignty, the Eastern Partnership must be included in the calculation.
TJ. How is the end of Merkel’s chancellorship likely to affect relations with the EaP?
EK. In January the CDU chose its new leader paving the way for the Chancellor Merkel’s succession in September. The obvious issue is what each candidate stood for and their preferred coalition partners. Rottgen, the youngest of the three candidates was bolder and advocated for a tougher stance on Russia and China. The CDU opted for a “continuity candidate,” namely Armin Lascher, likely to remain on the same policy course. It is unlikely there will be a major shift in foreign policy.
Recent polling suggests that Germany’s far left and far right electoral influence amounts to about 20%. Most voters opt for the major parties – first and foremost the CDU/CSU – that offer something for everyone, with no surprises. Trough the pandemic polling suggests that the Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party (Christian Social Union) have a secure 35% share of the vote.
A bit to the left, the Greens may pick up around 20%, making them a natural coalition partner for the CDU/CSU. Both parties are visibly preparing for such a “black-green” coalition. But this is the most unpredictable election in Germany in decades and a number of other configurations are also possible.
A CDU chancellor governing with the Greens will keep the balance between cooperation with NATO and security initiatives within the EU. For a left-wing coalition, in contrast, cooperation within NATO and with the US would look more controversial. Whether Europe will be able to strengthen its capacity to manage global threats largely depends on Berlin. Quite obviously, the EU will not learn to speak the language of power as long as Germany does not. But German leaders and the German public are somewhat scared of the recent rise in demand for German leadership because these expectations come hand-in-hand with the fear of German domination.
