Belgium (Brussels Morning newspaper), The beginning of the Russian invasion has provoked exceptional solidarity with Ukrainians as well as unity among the Member States on this matter. To accommodate and indeed welcome Ukrainians fleeing the war, in March 2022, the EU activated for the first time its Temporary Protection Directive, established already in 2001, to deal with the refugees’ influx. The EU’s first-ever use of the Temporary Protection provision for Ukraine has gone alongside the granting of candidate status, which means that the country and its citizens are now, in principle, on a track towards freedom of movement. This mechanism has allowed for bureaucracy-free entry into the EU for Ukrainians and extended to them three years of support for housing, living expenses, health care, education, and employment.
In her 2023 SOTEU speech, President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced the plans to extend the temporary protection for people fleeing Ukraine. Despite – or, rather, exactly because of – huge unknowns over when and how the war may end, putting this issue on the agenda is a timely step. Yet, the massive implications of this issue for Ukrainian citizens and the Ukrainian state urge for careful consideration on the one hand and a timely implementation on the other.
Ad hoc solution with long-term implications
To begin, consider first what would happen if there were no new framing of protection policy for Ukrainian citizens. After the three years are ended, the default situation under present EU law would be for refugees to face the obligation to return home or to apply for asylum as grounds for continued residence. However, the asylum system is incapable of handling millions of requests at a single point in time. So, the outcome would mean an unthinkable mass forced expulsion of millions of Ukrainians, citizens of an EU candidate state.
At the same time, Ukraine will need its citizens back home. Russia’s war has led to the flight of over 10% of the latter’s population, with over 4 million reaching the EU. But with the majority of the refugees being women and children, the distortion in Ukraine’s demographic structure could, unless reversed, become disastrous for the country’s future. Data recently released by the EU’s joint research center show that the proportion of prime-aged females to have left Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion is as high as 35 to 40%, while almost as high numbers apply to school-aged children.
To introduce yet another factor into the equation: when the war ends, the restriction on Ukrainian men of fighting age to leave the country will surely be lifted. This would concern around 1 million Ukrainian husbands, partners, and fathers anxious to join their families. Even if only half of them decide to join their families abroad, the depletion of Ukraine’s labor force would suffer another big blow.
Temporary Protection Mechanism: adjustments are needed
Both the government of Ukraine and the EU will thus want maximum return of the Ukrainian refugees but without the risk of a crude, mass expulsion. No one can know what the preferences of the refugees will be when the war ends or the three (or more) years of Temporary Protection expires. One can expect that after several years of progressive integration into the EU, with the Ukrainian children having learned local languages and made new friends and parents having found new professional activities, many will not want to be forced to return.
Many may fall into a further category of migrants who, after some further time acquiring new skills in the EU, will want indeed to return home or join in what has been called ‘circular migration’. This has been seen in the case of the member states acceding in the 2000s, with gradual return home a decade or more after the initial emigration, or as in all member states, old and new, of people developing quite complex and satisfying cross-border lives in more than one country.
The question is, therefore, how to do better than the ugly default policy of forcible expulsion or impractical mass asylum, especially considering Ukraine’s determination to join the EU. One formula would be to extend the three-year Temporary Protection for some more years with two additional elements. The first one would be to offer financial incentives to voluntary return applicants to help them rebuild their homes and professional careers. A second one would be to integrate the phasing out of Temporary Protection with a revision of the existing directive for the granting of long-term residence permits. The existing directive applies to immigrants who have spent a minimum of 5 years resident in the EU but excludes those benefitting from Temporary Protection. This exclusion should be scrapped.
The time to act is now
Whatever such arrangements are to be made, legislative action will be required from the EU in good time before early 2025, when the three years of Temporary Protection run out. This will take time, with two hazards to be avoided.
The first is that the policy-making possibilities in 2024 are going to be limited by the election of a fresh European Parliament and the renewal of the presidencies of the Commission and European Council. This will block out a significant amount of time and energy in the institutions.
The second hazard concerns the Hungarian presidency of the Council in the second half of 2024, which is already considered to be politically hazardous on general grounds. Hungary, in addition, adopts the most restrictive immigration policy among member states, being most inclined towards forcible expulsion of immigrants. One can be concerned that this could be a presidency most interested in sustaining the default policy outlined above. These considerations militate in favor of the EU addressing the forthcoming policy issues without delay.
More on the policy solutions to other pressing issues of the EU-Ukraine relations in the research study by the European Liberal Forum Designed in Brussels, Made in Ukraine.
